Recent developments in applied mathematics and mechanics: theory, experiment and practice. Devoted to the 80th anniversary of academician N.N.Yanenko

Akademgorodok, Novosibirsk, Russia, June 24 - 29, 2001



Abstracts


Siberian participants

Models of the system compromise in corporate control

Algazin G.I.

Altai state university (Barnaul)

The application of models of the system compromise for research of organization of interaction of the participants in control of corporation is considered: parent organizations and possible(probable) new terms (firms), which have intentions to realize in structure of corporation output-commercial activity in quality " of the centers ensuring profit ". Two factors influencing their profit are of interest for legs in dialogue process: volumes of manufacture of firms (vector $x $) and long of the profit (income) of firms, which last should pay to parent organization (vector $x_0 $) for activity on a guiding of the company. The center is interested in such controls $x_0 $ and $x $ to maximize profit of corporation. The firms, not having a possibility immediately to influence a choice of control $x_0 $, are interested in such combination of controls $x_0 $ and $x $ to maximize own profit. The distinction of interests of the participants attracts distinction in their choice of controls $x $, that defines(determines) conflict of a situation. The appropriate model of functioning of corporation can be noted as

a task of parent organization (center) begin {center} $F(x_0,x);longrightarrow;max_{x_0,x}, x_0in [0,1], xin X, $ end {center}

and task of firms (on an example of one of the participants) begin {center} f(x_0, x) ; longrightarrow ;max _ {x}, xin {Xcuptriangle X}. $ end {center}

Here distinction of sets of a choice of controls $x $ for the participants of corporation characterizes that circumstance, that the firms have the defined reserve by industrial possibilities $ triangle X $, which is unknown to the center.

As calculated the known model of hierarchical games is used. At designing mechanisms of a solution indicated interlevel conflict are realized as strategy of the participants information interchange and distribution of controlling variables.

The work is carried out at financial support RFBR, grant 00-06-80228

Note. Abstracts are published in author's edition



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